In this respect one point calls for discussion. Subsequently, only two distinct historical time frames allowed the Armenians to organize national-liberation movements comparable in dimension with the armed struggle of 1722-1735. First, during
the period from the 1890s to 1921, the year when the first Armenian republic (the two and a half year-old achievement of preceding hard struggle) was finally crushed under joint Russian-Turkish pressure; second, from 1988 to 1994, during the national campaign for the liberation of Karabakh from Azerbaijani domination.
It is of considerable interest to note that despite clear dissimilarities all three of these ethnopolitical social movements arose and developed in geopolitical situations, which had following major identical characteristics:
1. The outbreak of sharp interethnic and interstate conflicts throughout the Caucasian region, including Transcaucasia;
2. The intense geostrategic rivalry between Turkey, Iran, and Russia;
3. The derivation of the Caucasian crises from sweeping internal crises in at least one of the above mentioned regional "superpowers," specifically:
a) the period from 1722 to 1735 witnessed successive Afghan, Russian, and Turkish invasions of Iran and the concomitant breakdown of the Safavid Empire;
b) the period from the 1890s to 1921 coincided with a series of regional wars, World War I, and successive revolutions in all three powers -- in Russia (1905-1906, 1917), in Iran (1905-1911), and in Turkey (1908, 1919-1922).
c) the period from 1988 to 1994 corresponded to the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its serious aftermaths.
As for the Armenian liberation attempt of the 1720s, although it had many elements of self-defense (especially in the protracted armed resistance of Karabakh and Kapan), it had been planned decades before and therefore affords a unique
case of rebellion whose original aim was -- as stressed at the clandestine meeting of the Vaspurakan Armenians in September 1722 where there was a broad representation of the population -- "the liberation of all of blood-drenched Armenia". Thus, the Armenian liberation movement of the 1720s differed substantially from the movement at the turn of this century, which was essentially a self-defense phenomenon overwhelmingly concerned with the physical preservation of Western Armenia rather than the independence of all Armenia. Recently, Mkrtich Nersisian, the patriarch of genocide studies in Armenia, pointed once again to the false thesis of modern Turkish historiography that depicts the Ottoman Empire as a harmonious living place for every ethnic grouping. The late medieval-early modern Armenian aspirations for independence, demonstrated most vigorously in the 1720s, prove the reality of severe ethnoreligious oppression as practiced and institutionalized in the Ottoman state.
The Ottoman ruling establishment's new, Europeanized military thinking, which ensued in the 19th century, could have had only a modest impact on the Porte's genocidal policies of the turn of this century. James Reid's idea that the Ottoman Turkish military strategy of the massive destruction of populations developed later only through the 19th century following upon 1) the experience substructure of the raid tactics of irregulars in Turkey and the Caucasus, and 2) the influence of the modern European warfare concept of total war,  now appears to be unconvincing. As has been shown here, the Ottoman Turks had developed their own "annihilation ethic" much earlier. Much more valid is Dadrian's presentation of "Islamic Sacred Law as a Matrix of Ottoman Legal Order and Nationality Conflicts." Indeed, "genocidal ideologies may persist for a long time without becoming actualized in genocides." Turkish society proved to be extremely reluctant to accept modernization as implemented through Tanzimat
reforms in the 19th century. Certainly the reforms did not reach and change the traditional Millet structure of intercommunal attitudes. As a result, the Ottoman Turks retained and perpetuated many elements of their early modern society, including the belief system underpinning that society up to and during the Armenian massacres period of the 1890s-1922. Specifically, the Ottoman-Turkish tradition of genocidal retribution towards a rebellious ethnic group emerged during the Armenian Genocide in a twofold sense:
1) It provided a ready and convenient model for the Ottoman elite to exterminate the Armenians. Thus, Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey from 1913 to 1916, echoed this conclusion: "They (Ottoman elite) criticized their ancestors for neglecting to destroy or convert the Christian races to Mohammedanism at the time when they first subjugated them. Now... they thought the time opportune to make good the oversight of their ancestors in the 15th century." According to Austrian Vice-Field Marshal Pomiankowski, another well-informed witness and observer of the Armenian Genocide, "many intelligent Turks" spoke out that the conquered people "ought to have been exterminated long ago." 
2) Since it was already well known to the official classes and lower strata of the ruling ethnoreligious group, the order on the extermination of the Armenians was, using Morgenthau's parlance, "enthusiastically approved" by them and put into a conventional pattern of hostile behavior.
Finally, to recall and slightly amplify Mosca, "whatever practical value political science (including genocide studies -- A. A.) may have in the future, progress in that field will be based upon the study of the facts of society, and those facts can be found only in the history of the various nations....it is to the old historical method that we must return."